Real Policing

Johnno,

ACT ONE

A few months ago I attended a domestic incident where a father had assaulted his son and his wife.  He was still in the house when I arrived and I nicked him on suspicion of assault occasioning actual bodily harm x2.  A colleague stayed at the house and did the statement and photos and completed the domestic violence booklet.  It’s a pain in the backside to do this booklet but nonetheless it potentially has some use serving as a risk assessment.  As you will know domestic violence is rarely a one off incident.  So, although everyone hates to do them (another bloody form!) it is accepted that it can be a benefit to help manage the protection of the injured party.  The booklet is forwarded onto the domestic violence unit who follow up the incident and liaise with the victim.  From this info in the booklet and talking to the injured party, measures can be put in place where deemed necessary - like a panic alarm.  In my case the injured party was protected by bail conditions, a civil injunction and a police high response marker placed on the address. 

A couple of weeks back, the crime for this suddenly and without warning appeared back on my workload.  What’s this?  Someone has cocked this up, surely?  A call to the crime management unit to get this corrected left me dumbfounded.  I was told I had to phone the crime management unit back and update them with the answers to 40 questions for each crime.  There’s two crimes here so that’s 80 questions!  Firstly, WHY???  The guy has been CONVICTED.  It’s done and dusted.  Secondly, and far more importantly, the questions I need to update are the ones covered in the domestic violence booklet completed at the scene on the day by my colleague and sent to the domestic violence unit.  Why am I duplicating work here especially for a historic job that is finished with?  Stuff that.  I am not bothering.  I’m too busy dealing with today’s crimes. 

ACT TWO

I was left insulted, mystified and damn angry after having received an e-mail from human resources last week asking me to complete a survey.  Was this survey something of value?  Say, to do with improving officer safety?  No.  It was a pile of self evident political correctness gone bonkers asking me to state my sexual orientation!  What the hell has that to do with anyone else apart from me and my wife or, if I was a gay man, my partner?  How does your sexual orientation impact upon your ability to be a police officer anyway?  I don’t understand it.  The reason given was something to do with monitoring quotas, which were probably equality related.  It worries me that there is a consideration that the colour of your skin or your sexual preference should be a factor to be measured in your suitability to do the job.  I take everyone as they come and judge individuals on their own merit, both personally and professionally.  Surely that’s far more important than who they like to sleep with? 

Cheers.

Addressing the new recruits before being sworn in as constables and receiving their warrant cards, the words of Chief Constable Peter Neyroud would prove foreboding.  No sooner had he sat down than he declared how within the next few years one third of the intake would be lost to other forces.  What Mr. Neyroud predicted was actually part of a long established pattern of gain and loss, although, to one force in particular.  It isn’t difficult to understand why a considerable number of officers in the home counties transfer to the Metropolitan Police over other forces.  With the lure of an increase in salary and a particularly desireable style of policing, the process is facilitated by the outgoing force’s disinclination to retain experienced and competent officers by addressing their reasons for transfer. 

Two months prior to my joining Thames Valley Police in April, 2003, Mr. Neyroud decried the large number of his officers being poached by the Met.  After only a matter of weeks on the frontline I often heard my colleagues express a determined intention to transfer.  The Met had to do very little beyond offering overworked and under resourced constables a £6,000 pay increase in addition to a style of policing which reduced the administrative burden while minimising the time spent in custody.  Met officers are at liberty to arrest a supect and take them into custody to be processed by the prisoner handling team.  This particular method is intended to ensure the maximum number of resources on the street at any one time.  Within London the sheer volume of calls alone and the numbers available to deal with them may explain why officers are perhaps no more visible there than anywhere else.  Furthermore, Met practices are also frustrated by unnecessary paperwork, crippling bureaucracy and targets.  Nonetheless, the Met has no need to actively poach officers who will run to London with open arms as long as surrounding forces pay less while relying on the goodwill of their officers to suffer indefinitely an administrative burden which perpetuates inefficient reactive policing.  Those who joined the police to spend the maximum amount of time on the street undoubtedly find the lure of Met policing irresistible.  On his part, Mr. Neyroud suggested at one time that the incoming force should compensate Thames Valley Police for the loss of their officer. 

On the other hand, there are those within the management structure critical of the Met style of policing who contend that Met officers are under developed and poorly rounded.  The prevailing system of policing in the Met has drawn criticism for not developing the skills of those who do not rountinely investigate crime, interview offenders and build case file papers for court.  However, the need to create well rounded officers who prevent, react to and investigate crime was proportionate and easier to justify at a time when crime was at a considerably lower level than at present and frontline resources were plentiful.  The current circumstances require an approach which places the maximum number of boots on the ground at any one time if crime is to be truly driven down, potential offenders deterred and the public reassured.  It is no longer possible for such basic aims to be achieved as long as fewer resources are also investigating the current levels of crime to which they are having to respond.  As undesireable as it may be that officers are less well rounded in some areas than in others, under the present circumstances of too much crime being committed and too few people available to deal with it, it is time to decide whether the role of a constable to react, investigate and proactively police is contributing to overall inefficiency.    
              
There are obvious lessons to be drawn from the examples of officers who leave surrounding forces in droves for one which provides greater remuneration for a more desireable style of policing.  Money and job satisfaction are important considerations in any profession but particularly in those where the rewards are either few or intermittent.  Police officers are also human beings and will tolerate lower pay where there is job satisfaction or the lack of job satisfaction where there is higher pay.  Precious few would suffer the absence of both.  Officers who joined to do the job where it’s meant to be done won’t need to seek satisfaction elsewhere if change takes place where required.  At the heart of the matter is the issue of police efficiency and the role of the constable.  As a consequence of the competing policing demands on those responsible for meeting them and the unfulfilled intentions of successive Home Secretaries, the British bobby has increasingly become a jack of all trades and the master of none.      

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/2731203.stm

Johnno,

Regards,

The Government’s pledge to be tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime has been referred to as the biggest deception in history.  During a conversation with the officer responsible for this comment we discussed the necessity for identity cards and their capacity to prevent crime.  Government proposals that identity cards are necessary in the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration and organised crime do little to explain exactly how they will achieve their end.  Whether the same outcome could be achieved by other means has also received scant regard.  It is suggested that an identity card would allow an individual to confirm his or her identity in a convenient way using chip and PIN technology.  In contemplating the usefullness of ID cards, I considered the occasions when it would be necessary for an individual to confirm their identity, the kind of person who would be unwilling to provide confirmation and the measures police already have at their disposal in such instances.  

One of the selling points of identity cards is the ease with which the carrier can confirm their identity.  In lieu of any explicit information to the contrary I assume the Government is implying confirmation of identity to a police officer.  There are but a handful of instances where it is necessary for officers to ask for confirmation of identity, such as where there are grounds to suspect a person’s involvement in an offence (either as a perpetrator, aggrieved or a potential witness) or during a stop and search procedure.  In the majority of cases, the need for confirmation of identity arises when officers attend a scene either during or after the commission of a crime.  Experience of front-line policing has lead me to believe that those among the relatively law abiding who are asked by a police officer to confirm their identity are generally forthcoming in doing so.  Those less inclined to confirm their identity are often known to police anyway and, if known to police but not to an individual officer, are among those whose identity can be confirmed using other means, such as the National Fingerprint Identification System (NAFIS) in custody.  In either case, where involvement in an offence is suspected and identity is in doubt, establishing identity provides another reason to justify arrest.  It is entirely possible that the provision of ID cards will achieve no greater compliance from those already willing to offer confirmation of identity or those who are reluctant to reveal an identity which can be confirmed by other means.  As for crime investigation, the existence of CCTV, forensic evidence or intelligence can open up crucial lines of enquiry leading to the identity and arrest of an offender.  An ID card will tell an investigating officer little that is not already known prior to arrest.                                                

Another major selling point of identity cards is their purported necessity in the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration and organised crime.  In respect of terrorism, it was in fact circulation of CCTV images of the 21st July, 2005 bombers which led to their identification.  It is difficult to see how ID cards would have achieved the same outcome and how they will prevent further attacks from occurring.  In such cases, it is intelligence gathering, covert officer surveillance and CCTV which leads to the identification and targeting of terrorist suspects.  It is also worth noting that ID cards did not prevent the terrorist attack in Madrid on 11th March, 2004.  With regard to tackling illegal immigration and organised crime, the impact of ID cards is also difficult to discern.  It is highly unlikely that those who enter our country illegally will declare their illegal status in order to obtain an identity card.  It is also by no means certain that those who have entered illegally, whether or not they commit crime, will be deported back to their own country, in particular if it is regarded as socially unstable.  Controlling illegal immigration is an argument better suited to the reinforcement of our porous ports and other embarkation points than the introduction of ID cards.  As a means to fight organised crime, high grade intelligence and a thorough secondary investigation will yield far more in terms of identifying an offender (in the unlikely event the identity of anyone involved in organised crime is unknown to police), the extent of his criminality, his actions, assets, connections and associates.  Again, ID cards will tell an investigating officer little that is not already known prior to arrest                      

Whatever the reason for the Government’s implacable determination to introduce identification cards, it is somewhat disingenuous to justify doing so on crime prevention/investigation grounds.  ID cards are an unnecessary addition in light of other means which enable officers to identify those who are reluctant to identify themselves.  If the introduction of ID cards has not proved to be effective in combating crime, terrorism or illegal immigration in other countries there is no reason to suppose they will do so here.  Indeed, the tangible benefits of ID cards remain unproven.  Therefore, it is left to the testimony of those who enforce the law to identify their potential for preventing or investigating crime.  The most effective crime prevention tool is police officers on the ground the deterrent and reassurance value of which appears to have escaped the current Government.  If the Government had recognised their value in this regard they would have reduced bureaucracy, diverted the administrative burden away from officers (beyond that which ensures accountability), established a fairer system of measuring productivity and employed front-line officers in considerably greater numbers.  Better still, they would not have interferred at all.  The fact that they have and with such disasterous consequences suggests the kind of ignorance of crime prevention and investigation which will do little to inspire public confidence that the Government’s faith in ID cards is not misplaced. 

On Tuesday I appeared on The Alan Titchmarsh Show on ITV alongside LBC breakfast radio presenter Nick Ferrari and TV presenter Ulrika Jonsson to discuss the merits, or otherwise, of DNA and CCTV.  The discussion became polarised when Nick stated that such measures are an infringement of civil liberties.  Nick also contended that DNA does not work, citing a case of a 72 year-old Swindon man suffering from Parkinsons disease who was arrested and charged after his DNA profile matched that found at the scene of a burglary 200 miles away in Bolton.  BBC’s Panorama featured this particular case and attributed the error in identification to either a mislabelling of samples or a chance DNA match.  The charge against the male was subsequently reversed by the CPS.  In light of this and similar examples, DNA evidence cannot be regarded as infallible.  However, its effectiveness ought to be considered on the basis of successful outcomes which far outnumber rare identification anomalies and transference of DNA.  Importantly, DNA always requires supporting evidence linking the offender to the crime and not merely to the scene itself.  A jury would be unlikely to convict on the strength of DNA evidence alone and no judge is likely to instruct a jury to do so.  Whatever the infringement of DNA and CCTV upon civil liberties, in respect of crime investigation and detection the advent of both has proved invaluable.           

I wish to begin by explaining that due to the prevailing culture of risk assessments and litigation, police officers have much to do to ensure accountability.  Private information such as phone records, bank details and surveillance images is not laid bare for the police to have unhindered access.  Police officers are required (rightly so) to create a paper trail by which to justify why they require the information they seek in addition to whether such intrusion is proportionate to the proposed outcome of the investigation, whether the information can be acquired by other non-intrusive methods, how the information will serve to progress the investigation and also the extent to which intrusive methods are likely to infringe upon the civil liberties of innocent persons (referred to as collateral intrusion).  

Addressing the above points requires the completion of a document called a RIPA (Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000) which can run to several pages and in no way guarantees that because police officers ask for the information they are assured of getting it.  The RIPA form passes through the hands of a liaison officer before reaching the Superintendent and, in some cases, the Chief Constable, for authorisation.  It is then sent to the appropriate crime liaison department at the independent company/agency who then release the information to the intelligence bureau within the investigating force before it is passed to the investigating officer.  It is easy to draw alarming conclusions regarding the accessibility of private information based on the media’s portrayal of police practices.  I daresay I would draw similar conclusions if I were unfamiliar with the level of justification officers are required to show and the administrative hoops they have to jump through in order for the information to be considered for release.  Of course, I can only offer testament to the necessity for police officers to apply for private information in pursuit of the investigation and detection of crime.  As for the motivation and intentions of other bodies with similar access to the same information, I cannot truly say.        

With regard to DNA and CCTV, however sinster or menacing some may consider them to be, to an investigating officer with few lines of enquiry, the existence of one or both can affect the outcome of their investigation dramatically.  Having performed exactly the same tasks as 130,000 other officers allocated low to medium level crime to investigate, I feel justified in drawing from operational experience.  On Tuesday’s programme I retold an incident which occurred in High Wycombe involving a male arrested for being drunk and disorderly outside the town nightclub.  A DNA sample taken from the male in custody and sent to the Forensic Science Service for inclusion on the national database matched the profile recovered from the scene of an unsolved rape which occurred three years previously.  The male was charged with the offence and subsequently convicted.  Similarly, as the investigating officer of several crime reports where the aggrieved party did not report a crime against them for several days, I was left to retrieve CCTV footage as the last possible line of enquiry.  More often than not, subsequent circulation to other officers of stills from the CCTV images came back with a positive identification of the offender. 

Whilst I take into account Ulrika Jonsson’s point regarding more police officers on the beat, a robust and sustained officer presence is likely to drive down crime but will never completely eradicate it.  However, in order to investigate an offence they were unable to prevent, officers must have recource to certain investigative tools which increase the likelihood of a successful outcome.  I also wish to address the argument that CCTV drives crime into areas with no CCTV coverage.  Once again, I draw upon operational experience that in a large proportion of incidents, from drug induced thievery to a drunken rumpus or a violent assault, many such acts are opportunistic and are committed without regard to whether or not the offence is captured on CCTV.  Conversely, the progression of many an investigation can be scuppered by a timer-rotating CCTV camera pointing in the opposite direction to where the crime is taking place!        

Of course, in an ideal world where no crime is committed, police officers, DNA databases and CCTV cameras would be unnecessary.  However, we live in a world where those who successfully commit crime will not tell the truth about doing so.  Perhaps I am mistaken in thinking that the public place less trust in the Government than the police.  Yet, it is likely that public perception regarding the Government’s potential misuse of private information is the reason why many are unnerved by the increasing accessibility to it.  For a police officer, such information is not easily accessible at all, cannot be trawled through arbitrarily and indeed cannot be requested unless an offence has been committed where it can be shown that the individual is a suspect.  Furthermore, if a belief in the Government’s possible misuse of a national DNA database provides the strongest objection to it, establishing a database which is protected by an independent body accountable to the people and not to the Government ought to be considered.  Nonetheless, an issue of particular national importance is worthy of extensive national debate to decide if, having regard to all information and facts, the investigation and detection of crime justifies the continued infringement of civil liberties.                 

Next time: The falsehood of identity cards as a crime prevention measure. 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/player/nol/newsid_7010000/newsid_7012100/7012121.stm?bw=bb&mp=rm&news=1